The “Skirmishing” Ahead of the Battle of Tsushima: The Efforts by Diplomatic Officials to Gather Information about the Baltic Fleet

Introduction

Before dawn on May 27, 1905, at the height of the Russo-Japanese War, the converted cruiser Shinano Maru while on the watch in waters off the west coast of the Gotō Islands discovered the Russian Baltic Fleet on its way to Tsushima Strait. The details about the Battle of Tsushima (Battle of the Sea of Japan) that occurred after this between the Baltic Fleet and Japan’s Combined Fleet led by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō are well known. The Russians suffered a devastating loss, and their commander Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky himself was wounded and taken prisoner.

However, this is not to say that Japan merely waited for the Baltic Fleet to show up in the Sea of Japan. Japan had been searching for information about the fleet’s whereabouts even before it departed from its home waters in the Baltic Sea. The Navy General Staff took the lead in that information collection effort, but there were limits on the Navy’s ability to get information overseas. It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with its bases outside of the country in the form of diplomatic missions, that lent a hand in that effort.

The Prewar Diplomatic Records collection contains five sets of files grouped under the general name of “Items Related to the Eastward Journey of Russia’s Baltic Fleet During the Russo-Japanese War.” These files collate the results of the efforts of diplomatic officials in foreign countries to gather information. In this article, we peruse mainly these files to trace some aspects of their strenuous efforts in what might be described as a skirmish in advance of the Battle of Tsushima.

 

The Departure of the Baltic Fleet 

When the war began, Russia’s naval power in the Far East was inferior to that of Japan. Consequently, immediately after hostilities broke out, Russia began looking into the dispatch of a reinforcement fleet from the Baltic Sea. In early May, Rozhestvensky was appointed commander of the Baltic Fleet (formally, the Second Pacific Squadron). Japan appears to have been aware of these Russian moves no later than the last weeks of May (Item: “Partition 1,” Ref. B07090609000, image 6).

[Image 1] Item: “Dai-1-hen Rokoku zōken kantai ni taisuru sakusen junbi / Dai-7-shō Rokoku zōkan kantai tōkō shimatsu” [Section 1: Operational Preparations with Respect to the Russian Reinforcement Fleet/Chapter 7: Particulars Regarding the Eastward Movements of the Russian Reinforcement Fleet] (Ref. C05110083900, images 29–30, partially edited). This sea lane chart for the Baltic Fleet appeared in Imperial Japanese Navy war history documents.

 

Today, there are many books that tell the story of the Baltic Fleet’s voyage to the Sea of Japan and the outcome of that journey. At the time, however, it was not easy for Japan to obtain accurate information about when the fleet would be setting sail, or even whether or not it had actually been dispatched in the first place. For example, on July 14, Makino Nobuaki, who was stationed in Vienna as minister to what was then Austria-Hungary, passed along to Tokyo information he had received from a Russian collaborator that part of the Baltic Fleet had set sail bound for East Asia. However, Inoue Katsunosuke stationed as minister to Berlin said, based on information from multiple sources, that Makino’s report might be erroneous. Eventually, Makino himself checked again with his collaborator and reported that the information indeed was in error (see Item: “Partition 1,” Ref. B07090609000, images 34, 42, 45, and 47).

Then, on September 12, it was now Inoue who reported the departure of the Baltic Fleet based on a report carried by the German wire service Wolffs (see Image 2). Meanwhile, Makino sent a cable contradicting this, saying that, based on information obtained from “sources in Russia,” Russia had abandoned the idea of dispatching the fleet before the year’s end (see Image 3). As I will discuss later, given that the main force of the fleet left Russia behind in the middle of October 1904, ultimately both of these messages were in error.

[Image 2] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090609100, image 2, partially edited). Cable from Minister Inoue (translated text).

 

[Image 3] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090609100, image 6, partially edited). Cable from Minister Makino (translated text).

 

It is not difficult to imagine how collecting information in an enemy nation about one of that nation’s fleets would always be problematic. Furthermore, some harbored doubts about whether the Baltic Fleet could even be dispatched in the first place. For example, there is the report that Minister to France Motono Ichirō sent in about the contents of an article that ran in the French newspaper Le Temps. Based on that article, Motono said with regard to the idea of the fleet being set from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan, “No matter how you look it . . . there is absolutely no way that they could carry it out” (Item: “Bunkatsu 1” [Partition 1], Ref. B07090609000, image 16). In December after the fleet had set sail, King Vittorio Emmanuele III of Italy said to Minister Ōyama Tsunasuke that he surmised it would be recalled before it reached East Asia (see Image 4). This was because Russia had no bases of its own along the fleet’s planned route and would be faced with serious difficulties in refueling.

[Image 4] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090609900, image 61, partially edited). Cable from Minister Ōyama (translated text).

 

[Item 5] Item: “Bunkatsu 1” [Partition 1] (Ref. B07090610600, images 28–29, partially edited). Ambassador Inoue’s cable of April 1905. In it, he reports that comments about the disadvantages of the Baltic Fleet were spreading in German newspapers.

 

In fact, there were those in Russia who also opposed dispatching the fleet. In a diary entry dated September 31, imperial family member Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich wrote that while the move may have some support, there were others who believed that Russia had already “lost the chance [to dispatch the Baltic Fleet] and to do so was foolish.” According to Konstantin, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich—another imperial family member who was also a naval officer and involved with the development of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean—also held the same views and had even directly communicated his opposition to Emperor (Tsar) Nicholas II.

Be that as it may, this is not to say that all of the information that Japan’s diplomatic officials sent in was inaccurate. On October 9, Minister to Sweden Akizuki Satsuo passed along a news report from Russia that Russia’s emperor was going to the Baltic Fleet to inspect it before it set sail (see Image 6). This information was accurate, as the fleet subsequently weighed anchor on October 15 bound for East Asia.

 

[Image 6] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090609100, image 37). Cable from Minister Akizuki (translated text).

 

The Baltic Fleet in Europe

For the fleet to set out from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea, it had to pass through the territorial waters of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Of interest here, Denmark was the home country of Emperor Nicholas II’s mother Empress Dowager Maria Feodorovna. On October 17, two days after the fleet departed, it weighed anchor off the Danish island Langeland and began the task of loading coal. Minister to the Netherlands Mitsuhashi Nobukata (Denmark also came within his purview) reported to Tokyo that arrangements were being made for the fleet’s passage (see Item: “Bunkatsu 5” [Partition 5], Ref. B07090609400, image 1) and that it would arrive sometime on the 17th (see Image 7).

 

[Image 7] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090609100, image 41). Cable from Minister Mitsuhashi (translated text).

 

Less than one week later, as it transited the North Sea the Baltic Fleet attacked a British fishing fleet that it mistook for a Japanese torpedo boat squadron. This led to strains between the British and the Russians. Referred to as the Dogger Bank Incident, the affair itself is well-known, but here we will introduce a somewhat comical exchange related to it. Following the incident, Le Temps reported that Japanese espionage agents based in Stockholm, Sweden, were busying themselves with preparations for a torpedo attack on the fleet. Minister Akiyama asked Sweden’s foreign minister for his views on the matter. The foreign minister responded that he had no inklings whatsoever that any such “espionage agents” had entered the country, and stressed his assumption that there were no Japanese in Sweden aside from legation staff (see Image 8). Of course, Japan did not carry out any attack on the fleet in the North Sea. However, Army Colonel Akashi Motojirō, who became famous for his espionage activities during the Russo-Japanese War, was using Sweden as the base for his activities (see Image 9). Akashi is said to also have had contacts in the Swedish military. Furthermore, as noted above, Minister Akizuki himself had been reporting on the fleet’s movements. In other words, the legation staff themselves in fact were espionage agents of a sort.

 

[Image 8] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2], (Ref. B07090609200, image 14). Cable from Minister Akizuki (translated text.).

 

[Image 9] Item: “7. Akashi Motojirō-taishō jutsu, Rakka ryūsui, ji Shōwa 13-nen 5-gatsu” [7. General Akashi Motojirō’s statement, “Rakka ryūsui,” from May 1938] (Ref. B12080958600, image 57). The contact network depicted in then-Captain Akashi’s journal. On the drawing, “瑞典” are the phonetic-equivalent characters (ateji) used for “Sweden.”

 

The Swedish foreign minister’s stance suggested his country tacitly accepted Japan’s espionage activities. One could also hold up Britain and the U.S. as other countries that had shown themselves as being favorable toward Japan. Both were officially neutral, and neither attempted to participate directly in the Russo-Japanese War. However, that is not to say that Japan did not receive any help from either the British and US governments or from British or American individuals. Japanese diplomatic officials likewise received all kinds of help when it came gathering information about the Baltic Fleet.

Rozhestvensky’s fleet arrived at the Port of Vigo in Spain at the end of October. However, the Dogger Bank Incident had developed into a diplomatic issue between Britain and Russia, and so his government instructed him to hold the fleet on standby in the port for the time being. The Japanese legation in Spain used the opportunity to send an embassy clerk named Arai to Vigo. Based on his report, Arai not only collected information from local newspapers but also got help from the U.S. consul and from persons connected with a British “telegraphic company.” Furthermore, through the good offices of the U.S. consul, he also obtained photos of the Russian warships from a British individual (see Images 10 and 11).

 

[Image 10] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090609900, images 64–65, partially edited). The report from embassy clerk Arai.

 

[Image 11] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090609900, image 69). The photographed obtained by embassy clerk Arai.

 

Similar sorts of help were also received in other places around Europe. For example, in a report to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, Minister to Italy Ōyama said he was receiving help in gathering information from a naval attaché to the British Embassy as well as from correspondents for the British wire service Reuters (see Image 12) Additionally, Minister Makino stationed in Austria-Hungary was getting information from a correspondent for The Times of London stationed in St. Petersburg (Item: “Partition 5,” Ref. B07090610200, image 19).

 

[Image 12] Item: “Bunkatsu 4” [Partition 4] (Ref. B07090610100, image 44). Report from Minister Ōyama.

 

From Africa to Asia

On the evening of October 31, the Baltic Fleet received permission from the Russian government to set out from the Port of Vigo. Accordingly, it headed toward Tangiers in Morocco.

At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s ally Britain and Russia’s ally France both had many colonies in Africa and in Asia beyond. France was also firmly neutral in the Russo-Japanese conflict, and what’s more some two months after the fighting had broken out France had concluded its Entente Cordial with Britain. The two Western European countries found themselves in the difficult position of being friendly nations whose respective allies were at war with one another. Nevertheless, just as Japan received certain accommodations from the British, Russia received a certain amount of assistance from the French. After departing Tangiers, the fleet split up into a main force that took a route around the Cape of Good Hope and a detachment that went through the Suez Canal. They chose the French territory of Madagascar as their rendezvous point.

Rozhestvensky’s main force was not expected to show up at the French territory until the end of December. However, on December 2 Minister to France Motono was already proposing to Tokyo that a Norwegian spy be sent there (Item: “1. France,” Ref. B07090612000, image 3). The proposal was approved, and it appears that this spy actually went there to conduct an investigation. In volume 3 of  “Items Related to the Eastward Journey of Russia’s Baltic Fleet During the Russo-Japanese War” (Ref. B07090610300), there is a report that includes a diagram of the anchorages for the fleet (see Image 13).

 

[Image 13] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090610700, image 20). A diagram showing the anchorages for the Baltic Fleet at Nosy Be Island.

 

The Baltic Fleet wound up staying in Madagascar until mid-March. The flotilla of the German shipping company contracted to deliver coal had been brought to a standstill out of a reluctance to lend assistance over concerns about Japanese attacks. Also, in January 1905 the Russian base at Port Arthur had fallen into Japanese hands and the First Pacific Squadron that had been anchored there in Lüshun Harbor was wiped out. Given these changes in the situation, the Baltic Fleet postponed its departure yet again to await the arrival of reinforcements (see Image 14).

 

[Image 14] Item: “Bunkatsu 4” [Partition 4] (Ref. B07090610100, image 34). Minister Makino’s report on the debate over the dispatch of a reinforcement fleet and other issues in the Russian newspaper Novoye Vremya (Новое время).

 

The Baltic Fleet finally rendezvoused with elements of its reinforcement squadron, and together they set out from Madagascar. News of this departure, too, made its way to Japan through multiple channels. Particularly interesting is a report left to us saying that a member of of Italy’s royal family communicated information directly to Minister Ōyama (see Image 15).

 

[Image 15] Item: “Bunkatsu 1” [Partition 1] (Ref. B07090610100, image 1). Cable from Minister Ōyama.

 

Meanwhile, in the British colony of Singapore, Consul Tanaka Tokichi was trying to track down the Russian fleet, which it was anticipated was on its way to Southeast Asia. In a cable dated April 8, he reported having received information from a British mail boat that the fleet had sailed near the One Fathom Bank Lighthouse in the Straits of Malacca (see Image 16). Tanaka would continue to get information from harbor officials and from British naval officers (see Image 17).

 

[Image 16] Item: “Bunkatsu 1” [Partition 1] (Ref. B07090610600, image 15, partially edited). Cable from Consul Tanaka.

 

[Image 17] Item: “Bunkatsu 1” [Partition 1] (Ref. B07090610600, image 21, partially edited). Cable from Consul Tanaka.

 

The Foreign Ministry documents also contain evidence that American colonial authorities also lent their assistance. Narita Gorō was serving as consul to the Philippines, which were then under U.S. rule. There, he made arrangements with U.S. military officials to be provided with the cables they had received (see Image 18).

 

[Image 18] Item: “Bunkatsu 1” [Partition 1] (Ref. B07090610600, image 60, partially edited). Cable from Consul Narita.

 

In mid-April as Japan’s diplomatic officials were bustling about in their work, Rozhestvensky and his fleet arrived in French Indochina. There they awaited the arrival of the trailing Third Pacific Squadron.

 

Hong Kong and Indochina

One of Japan’s regional bases for gathering information when the Baltic Fleet had stashed itself in French Indochina was the British colony of Hong Kong. Local Consul Noma Seiichi solicited Alfred Cunningham, the journalist from London who co-founded the South China Morning Post, for his assistance in investigating the fleet’s movements. On April 12, Cunningham headed to Singapore aboard the SS Prinz Heinrich (Item: “13. Hong Kong,” Ref. B07090613200, image 21). En route, the Prinz Heinrich spotted the fleet at anchor in Cam Ranh Bay, and Cunningham’s report on this discovery was transmitted to Tokyo via Noma on the 17th (see Image 19).

 

[Image 19] Item: “Bunkatsu 1” [Partition 1] (Ref. B07090610600, image 43, partially edited). Cable from Consul Noma.

 

On April 22, the Baltic Fleet began transferring to Van Phong Bay, also in French Indochina. Cunningham visited Cam Ranh Bay himself and would report to Noma that the fleet was no longer there (see Image 20). Its exact location had become unknown. It was not until April 30 that Consul Noma obtained an eyewitness report that the fleet was now anchored in Van Phong Bay (see Image 21). This information was provided by the captain of a British vessel that had come into port at Hong Kong.

 

[Image 20] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090610700, image 13, partially edited). Cable from Consul Noma.

 

[Image 21] Item: “Bunkatsu 2” [Partition 2] (Ref. B07090610700, image 88, partially edited). Cable from Consul Noma.

 

Then, on May 17, a German vessel provided Noma with the information that it had come across the Baltic Fleet setting sail (see Image 22). The information was correct. The fleet had departed Indochina on May 14 after having rendezvoused with the trailing squadron for which it had been waiting. On top of being exhausted from its long voyage, the Baltic Fleet was numerically inferior to Tōgō Heihachirō’s Combined Fleet. Its goal therefore was to somehow avoid any Japanese attacks and get to the port of Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. There were three possible routes that it could take. One was to go around the Pacific Ocean side of the Japanese archipelago and go through the Soya Strait. Another was to enter the Sea of Japan through the Tsugaru Strait. Finally, the shortest route was to go through the waters off Tsushima. The fleet’s commander Rozhestvensky hung his hopes on succeeding with the Tsushima route.

 

[Image 22] Item: “Bunkatsu 3” [Partition 3] (Ref. B07090610800, image 91, partially edited). Cable from Consul Noma.

 

Conclusion

In a diary entry dated May 29, Emperor Nicholas II wrote the following about the naval battle that had unfolded at Tsushima two days before.

“Conflicting reports and information began arriving today about the battle between our warships and the Japanese fleet. All of it is about the damage to us, but it has nothing to say about the damage to [the Japanese]. This lack of information makes me feel very gloomy.”

The fact that there were no reports about damage to the Japanese side was not just because of a gap in information. Of the 38 Russian ships that took part in the Battle of Tsushima, only the cruiser Alamaz and two destroyers somehow reached their intended destination of Vladivostok. In contrast, the Japanese fleet lost only three torpedo boats. There was no significant damage to the Japanese side at all. However, what this diary entry does speak to is just how difficult it was to get accurate information quickly at a time when there were no satellites or internet. It was not until June 1 that Nicholas II would write that they had finally confirmed the “awful news” about the destruction of his empire’s fleet.

It was a matter of course for most of the reports from Japanese diplomatic officials regarding the Baltic Fleet to arrive in Tokyo several days after the fleet’s actual movemements, and they frequently lost track of its exact location. In addition, as we have seen in this article there were also instances where those reports included contradictory information. However, in light of how difficult it was to gather information at the time, one could say that there was an unavoidable aspect to such complications. Diplomatic officials used a variety of methods including collecting newspaper reports and making trips to the scene to get a general sense of the fleet’s movements. Sometimes foreign collaborators produced valuable information, but again it was diplomatic officials who had developed the cooperative relationships with those persons.

The lead players in the Battle of Tsushima were navy men; diplomatic officials did not make an appearance. However, their strenuous efforts lurked in the shadows of the glorious victory scored by Tōgō Heihachirō’s Combined Fleet.

 

 

*When citing materials in the original Japanese text, some changes were made for ease of reading. Furthermore, in Russia at the start of the 20th century the Julian calendar was still in use. However, for the purposes of this article, all dates from contemporary Russian materials have been converted to the present-day (“Gregorian”) standard.

 

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Okabe Katsuya, Researcher, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records