The US-Japan War Talks as seen in official documents
Prime Minister Minister of Foreign Affairs Date Time Event Commentary
Fumimaro Konoe Yosuke Matsuoka February 11 (Tue.)   (US time) Ambassador Nomura arrives in Washington. Kichisaburo Nomura assumes his duties in Washington as Ambassador to the United States.
March 12 (Wed.)   Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka visits Germany and Italy by way of the Soviet Union. Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka visits Germany and Italy by way of the Soviet Union. He works to conclude the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, but was unable to have the country included in the Tripartite Military Alliance with Japan, Germany and Italy.
April 16 (Wed.)   (US time) During a meeting between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary of State Hull, Hull requests the Japanese government make an official order in response to the “Japan–US Draft Agreement,” that was obtained from Japan through internal maneuvering. Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura meets with Secretary of State Hull. Hull received from Nomura the “Japan–US Draft Agreement,” which was created through unofficial correspondences between Japan and the US. Hull requests that the Japanese government take the necessary procedures to begin formal negotiations.
May 12 (Mon.) 11:00- (US time May 11, 22:00–) At a meeting between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary of State Hull, Nomura hand delivers Japanese Government proposed amendments to the “Japan–US Draft Agreement.” Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura meets with Secretary of State Hull. Ambassador Nomura delivers to Secretary of State Hull the “Japan–US Draft Agreement,” which was drastically revised and included the requests of Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka
June 11 (Wed.)   (Time unknown) The 29th Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conference (Agenda: Negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands). The 29th Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conference is held. Facing an American export ban, Japan maneuvered to secure the resource-richDutch East Indies but was unsuccessful. Japan then decided to withdraw its personnel from the Dutch East Indies.
June 22 (Sun.)   Outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Germany invades the Soviet Union. Japan finds itself in a difficult situation with its ally Germany breaking the Nonaggression Pact by attacking the Soviet Union, a country to which Japan is also bound through the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact
June 22 (Sun.) 1:00- (US time June 21, 12:00–) At a meeting between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary of State Hull, Hull delivers an oral statement and on May 31 (Japan time June 1), the US Government’s amendments to the Japanese proposal are presented. Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura meets with Secretary of State Hull Both Japan and the US suggest modifications to the Japan–US Draft Agreement, and Hull presents the US Government’s amendments to the Japanese proposal on May 31. Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka reacts sharply when learning of the proposed amendments, and negotiations are undermined.
July 2 (Wed.) 10:00-12:00 The 5th Imperial Conference (Agenda: Imperial National Policy, Southeast Asia Policy, and British / US Policy) The 5th Imperial Conference is held. The Southeast Asia policy that was decided on at the Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conference on June 25 and 28 was reconsidered and details regarding the stationing of troops in Southern French Indochina were determined.
Teijiro Toyoda July 16 (Wed.)   The second Konoe Cabinet resigns (on the following day, the third Konoe Cabinet is formed with Teijiro Toyoda as Minister of Foreign Affairs). The second Fumimaro Konoe Cabinet resigns. The third Konoe Cabinet is formed the next day. The primary reason for forming the new cabinet was to replace Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka, who had taken a hard-line approach towards the Japan–US War Talks, with Teijiro Toyoda
July 24 (Thurs.) 4:00- (US time July 23, 15:00–) At a meeting between Ambassador Nomura and acting Secretary of State Wells, Nomura explains the stationing of troops in French Indochina. Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura meets with acting Secretary of State Wells while Secretary of State Hull was convalescing. Nomura explains that the stationing of troops in South French Indochina on July 28 is unavoidable for Japan. Wells responds by warning of deteriorating Japan-US relations.
August 1 (Fri.)   The US bans oil exports to all aggressor countries (this includes motor fuel and lubricating oil for airplanes). The US announces a ban on oil exports to “aggressor countries,” including Japan. This was just as acting Secretary of State Wells had warned Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura on July 24. Thus, Japan begins to face serious problems regarding the procurement of resources.
August 7 (Thurs.)   (Time unknown) Minister of Foreign Affairs Toyoda gives instructions to Ambassador Nomura to propose a meeting between Prime Minister Konoe and US President Roosevelt. Minister of Foreign Affairs Teijiro Toyoda asks Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura to request a meeting between Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe and US President Roosevelt. With Japan-US relations deteriorating, Minister of Foreign Affairs Toyoda begins to view this meeting as the key to ending the deadlock.
August 14 (Thurs.)   US President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Churchill announce the Atlantic Charter. US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill meet just off the Atlantic coast of Newfoundland. They discuss their visions for the post-World War II world, and following the meeting, announce the conclusion of the Atlantic Charteron August 14.
August 17 (Sun.)   (US time) At the fourth meeting between Ambassador Nomura and US President Roosevelt, Roosevelt answers that clarification of Japan’s basic position and policy are required before the informal discussions that were halted in July are able to resume. Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura conducts his fourth meeting with US President Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt warns that Japanese military advance would threaten Japan’s proposal for a Japan-US summit meeting and points out the necessity of a change in attitude before the summit meeting is held.
August 28 (Thurs.) 1:00- (US time August 27 12:00–) At a meeting between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary of State Hull, Nomura delivers a copy of the “Konoe Message.” Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura meets with Secretary of State Hull. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe had prepared for US President Franklin Roosevelt the “Konoe Message” that emphasized the importance of a summit meeting between the two countries’ leaders, and instructs Ambassador Nomura to deliver this message to Roosevelt. Prior to this, Nomura hands a copy of the message to Hull.
September 6 (Sat.) 10:00-12:00 The 6th Imperial Conference (Decision: Outline of Imperial national policy and preparation for war against the US, Britain, and the Netherlands near the end of October.) The 6th Imperial Conference is held. It is decided that preparations for war at the end of October are necessary as war with Britain and the US is inevitable. It is decided at this conference that Japan will continue negotiations with the US while it prepares for war, and then launch a quick attack when its request are not agreed to.
October 12 (Sun.)   (Time unknown) Prime Minister Konoe holds a meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Toyoda, Minister of the Army Tojo, Minister of the Navy Oikawa, and Minister of the Cabinet Planning Board Suzuki regarding the advantages and disadvantages of war. The navy opposes withdrawing troops from China. Prime Minister Konoe invites Minister of Foreign Affairs Teijiro Toyoda, Minister of the Army Hideki Tojo, Minister of the Navy Koshiro Oikawa and Minister of the Cabinet Planning Board Teijiro Suzuki to his private home for a discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of war. During the meeting, Konoe and Toyoda point out possible solutions, including withdrawing troops from China, however, Tojo strongly opposes.
Hideki Tojo Shigenori Togo October 18 (Sat.)   Hideki Tojo forms cabinet. The third Fumimaro Konoe Cabinet resigns and Hideki Tojo forms cabinet. Tojo becomes Prime Minister, Army Minister, and Home Minister, in control of politics, the military, and the police. Tojo, who had insisted on war with Britain and the US as Minster of Army, made clear his intentions for war on other countries now that he was in power.
November 5 (Wed.) 10:30-15:15 The 7th Imperial Conference (Agenda: Negotiation with the US (Draft A / Draft B), Outline of Imperial national policy.) The 7th Imperial Conference is held. Two different Japanese proposals are decided on for submission to the US. These two plans are referred to as Draft A and Draft B. Japan plans to first propose Draft A in negotiations and if not accepted, propose Draft B, which includes additional concessions.
November 16 (Sun.) 3:30- (U.S. time November 15, 13:30–) Special Envoy Saburo Kurusu arrives in Washington. Special envoy Saburo Kurusu arrives in Washington and joins the Japan-US War Talks. Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura found himself in an impasse in negotiations and had requested assistance. In response, the veteran diplomat Kurusu, who had been Nomura’s colleague in the US, was dispatched. This represented Japan’s last attempt at negotiations employing Draft A and Draft B.
November 17 (Mon.)   Prime Minister Tojo makes a speech on policy towards the US at an extraordinary session of the Imperial Diet. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo makes a speech on policy towards the US at an extraordinary session of the Imperial Diet and expresses a hard-line stance towards the US.
November 26 (Wed.)   The Hawaii Strategic Task Force engages in a sortie from Hitokappu Bay. The Hawaii Strategic Task Force engages in a sortie from Hitokappu Bay, Etorofu. The military prepares for war, while tensions in Japan-US relations fail to ease. A navy unit prepares to attack Pearl Harbor on this day. However, they were told to turn back in case the possibility of a breakthrough emerged at the final stage.
November 27 (Thurs.) 6:45-8:45 Ambassadors Nomura and special envoy Kurusu meet with US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Hull rejects Draft B, then presents the “Hull Note.” Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura and Extraordinary Ambassador Saburo Kurusu meet with US Secretary of State Hull. During the meeting, Hull presents the “Hull Note,” which demonstrated rejection Draft B. This meant that Draft B, the final strategy for Japanese negotiations as decided at the 7th Imperial Conference had failed.
December 1 (Mon.) 14:05-16:00 The 8th Imperial Conference (Agenda: decision of war with the US, Britain, and the Netherlands.) The 8th Imperial Conference is held. The Japan government dismisses any possibility of a breakthrough in negotiations with the US after delivery of the “Hull Note” on November 27. Engaging in war with the US, Britain, and the Netherlands is formally decided upon at this conference.
December 6 (Sat.)   (U.S. time, afternoon) Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu report to Japan that US President Roosevelt had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor. Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura and Extraordinary Ambassador Saburo Kurusu learn from an announcement made by the State Department that President Roosevelt had sent a personal telegram to the Showa Emperor and report this to Japan. Although the content of the message to the emperor sought a peaceful resolution, it could not prevent the outbreak of the war between the countries.
December 8 (Mon.) 4:20 (U.S. time December 7, 14:20) Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu hold a meeting with US Secretary of State Hull to deliver their ultimatum. Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura and special envoy Saburo Kurusu meet with US Secretary of State Hull. Both ambassadors delivered the “Memorandum against the United states,” which presented the Japanese government’s official intention to break off negotiations. This was virtually an ultimatum to the United States, showing that the outbreak of war between these countries was unavoidable. However, by the time the memorandum had been delivered to the US, the Imperial Japanese Navy had already begun the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Explanatory notes
- Date and time specification in the chronology is set in principle with Japan Standard Time.
- As only US times are found in the documents, the time difference is calculated as a fourteen-hour difference between the negotiation locations of Washington and Japan. However, the time difference is calculated as a thirteen-hour difference during Daylight Saving Time in the United States (starting from 2:00 a.m. on the first Sunday of April to 2:00 a.m. on Sunday of the last week in October).
- As described above, if the US time has been ascertained to be correct with respect to the Japanese time, ( ) is used to denote the US time at the beginning of the item, such as “(US time 14:20).”
- Conversely, if only the Japanese time is clearly listed, the local time is calculated using the time difference calculation as noted above, and ( ) is used to denote the local time at the beginning of the item.
- For some material in the table, only the US time is given. This is due to the fact that the Japan time cannot be calculated accurately. In these exceptional circumstances, only the “US time” is given in ( ) at the head of the item, and the date associated with the US time is listed in the chronological table.
- In addition, for areas where only “US time morning” or “US time afternoon” is listed, the time that is originally US time afternoon is equivalent to Japanese time the following day. However, in order to avoid confusion, the same system mentioned above is used here and “US time morning” or “US time afternoon” is given in ( ) at the head of item, and the date associated with the US time is listed in the chronological table.
- Concerning the telegram, the time that the telegram was sent is used.
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